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Abstract
This paper studies whether the unemployment dynamics of immigrants
diﬀer from those of natives, paying special attention to the impact of ac-
counting for unobserved heterogeneity among individuals. Using a large
administrative data set for Spain, we estimate multiple-spell discrete du-
ration models which disentangle unobserved heterogeneity from duration
dependence. Speciﬁcally, we estimate random eﬀects models assuming
that the distribution of the eﬀects is discrete with ﬁnite support, and
ﬁxed eﬀects models in which the distribution of the unobserved eﬀects
is left unrestricted. Our results show the importance of accounting for
unobserved heterogeneity and that mistaken policy implications can be
derived due to improper treatment of unmeasured variables. We ﬁnd that
lack of control for unobserved heterogeneity leads to the conclusion that
immigrant males have a higher probability of leaving unemployment than
natives and that the negative eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts for immi-
grants lasts longer than for natives. Nonetheless, the estimates which do
control for unobserved heterogeneity show the opposite results.
JEL classiﬁcation: J64, J61, C23, C41, J65
Keywords: Duration models; Discrete choice; Multiple spells; Unobserved
heterogeneity; Unemployment; Immigration.
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During the last years, economists have paid considerable attention to the eﬀects
of immigration on natives’ labor market outcomes (see Borjas, 2003, Ottaviano
and Peri, 2006). Other strand of the literature has studied the assimilation
process of immigrant workers as their residence in the host country lengthens,
focusing basically on the speed of the “catch up” process of immigrant wages
to those of natives (see Chiswick, 1986, LaLonde and Topel, 1992, Card, 2005).
The economics literature concerning immigration has also shown that there are
important diﬀerences between the labor market performance of native born and
foreign born individuals (see Borjas, 1994). However, no much attention has
been paid to the unemployment behavior of immigrants and, in particular, to
whether the duration of their unemployment spells diﬀers from those of natives.
Considering that immigrants’ use of public transfers, such as unemployment
beneﬁts, is of major policy concern, this is surprising.1
This paper contributes to this empirical literature by analyzing whether the
unemployment duration path of immigrants diﬀers from that of natives. It
also studies the eﬀect of unemployment insurance beneﬁts on unemployment
duration for both groups of workers. Our basic motivation is to facilitate the
distinction between unobserved heterogeneity and true duration dependence in
the exit rate from unemployment for immigrants and natives.
One of the major issues in the econometric analysis of individual unem-
ployment durations is the distinction between what has been called “true” and
“spurious” duration dependence (see Heckman, 1991). It is well known that
improper treatment of unmeasured variables could give rise to a relationship
between future and past unemployment due solely to uncontrolled heterogene-
ity. Moreover, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity might give an alterna-
1Some papers have studied how employment and unemployment probabilities diﬀer be-
tween natives and immigrants (see Chiswick et al., 1997, Uhlendorﬀ and Zimmermann, 2006).
Others have looked at diﬀerences in welfare participation between immigrants and natives








tive explanation for the negative duration dependence typically observed in the
data. The reason is that individuals with the highest hazards on average leave
unemployment quickest so those who are still unemployed at high durations
tend to have lower values of the unobserved variables and thus lower hazards.
Therefore, if one ignores the presence of unobserved heterogeneity the estimated
duration dependence will be too negative. In this paper, we analyze if the im-
pact over the unemployment hazard rate of the unobserved heterogeneity diﬀers
among immigrants and natives.
We use a large administrative data set, the Spanish Muestra Continua de
Vidas Laborales (MCVL), which contains information on approximately 1,1
million people in the year 2005 and which covers their entire labor market his-
tory. This data set provides a clear advantage over other data sets used in the
literature, since it oﬀers information on multiple spells of unemployment for the
same individual,2 and this is crucial to disentangle unobserved heterogeneity
from genuine duration dependence.
We apply discrete duration models to our multiple spell data for immigrants
and natives separately. Speciﬁcally, we estimate by maximum likelihood random
eﬀects models assuming that the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity is
discrete with ﬁnite support (see Heckman and Singer, 1984). The support point
approach with multiple spells allows for a better identiﬁcation of the parameters
of interest than when only a single spell is available for each individual. Nonethe-
less, in practice it is often diﬃcult to ﬁnd more than a few diﬀerent mass points,
which reﬂects a lack of informativeness about the distribution of the unobserved
eﬀects in the data. For that reason, we also estimate a ﬁxed eﬀects model in
which the full distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity is left unrestricted
and allowed to be dependent of the explanatory variables of the model. Follow-
ing Frederiksen, Honoré and Hu (2007), we use the information on the multiple









spells for each worker to rule out the individual unobserved heterogeneity, in
the spirit of the ﬁxed eﬀects discrete choice panel data models. We highlight
the impact of leaving the distribution of the heterogeneity unrestricted on the
estimation of the eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts on unemployment duration.
Spain can be considered an interesting case for investigating these issues in
the context of unemployment duration for immigrants and natives. It is one of
the European countries where immigration ﬂows during the last decade have
increased most noticeably. The foreign-born population living in Spain surged
from around 350 thousand (1% of the total population) in 1991 to more than
4.3 million (10% of total the population) in 2006. Over the period 2000-2005
immigration accounted for almost all of the increase of working-age population,
and had noticeable macroeconomic eﬀects not only on the size, but also on the
composition of aggregate supply and aggregate demand, contributing to sustain
a long-lasting economic expansion that started in the mid-nineties.
Our results show that mistaken policy implications can be derived due to
improper treatment of unmeasured variables. We ﬁnd that lack of control of
unobserved heterogeneity leads to the conclusion that immigrant males have a
higher probability of leaving unemployment than natives and that the negative
eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts for immigrants lasts longer than for natives.
Nonetheless, the estimates which do control for unobserved heterogeneity show
the opposite results. Moreover, we ﬁnd that for some groups of workers (native
females and immigrant males) it seems that there is a great deal more of unob-
served heterogeneity than the one captured by a random eﬀects model with three
mass points, while for native males and immigrant females the results from the
random eﬀects and the ﬁxed eﬀects models are very similar. Since we have not
estimated a structural model of duration, it is diﬃcult for us to interpret which
factors are behind the unobserved eﬀects. Nonetheless, a possible explanation








one component of the hazard rate, probably the acceptance behavior, for those
individuals for whom the mass point distribution is enough to control for such
heterogeneity. On the contrary, native females and immigrant males might have
a more complex inﬂuence of such heterogeneity both over the arrival rate of job
oﬀers and the acceptance probability (see García-Pérez, 2006) and, hence, this
is not totally captured by a discrete distribution with three mass points.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the econometric
model and discusses the estimation procedures. Section 3 provides a brief re-
view of the related literature, presents some background information about im-
migrants performance in the Spanish labor market, and describes the data.
Section 4 reports and discusses the estimation results. Finally, Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 Models and Estimators
We analyze the dependence of exit from unemployment on the length of time
unemployed and on other variables by the estimation of duration models. At
any point in time, an individual could be in any of two states: Unemployed or
Employed. We estimate hazard rates between unemployment and employment
for natives and immigrants separately by estimating the probability that an
individual will leave unemployment during the next period, given that she has
been unemployed for T periods. We treat duration (T) as a discrete variable.3
For individual i the probability of a spell being completed by time t + 1 given
that it was still continuing at time t is given by
hi(t) = Pr(Ti = t | Ti ≥ t,bi(t),xi(t)) = F(α0 + α1(t)bi(t) + α2(t)xi(t) + γi(t)).
(1)
Our analysis is conditional on bi(t), a dummy variable taking the value 1 if
the individual receives unemployment beneﬁts in period t. The history of beneﬁt








entitlements is observed in our data. Therefore, we do not need to estimate a
process for this variable and it is not necessary to treat it as endogenous. That
is, the probability in (1) is conditional on the entire path of b(t) and we do not
need to allow for feedback from T, the unemployment duration, to future values
of b (see Bover, Arellano & Bentolila, 2002, for a detailed discussion on this
issue).
In addition to beneﬁts, we also condition on a vector of exogenous variables
xi(t), which includes a set of individual, sectorial and aggregate variables. γi(t) is
a parameter that captures duration dependence and is a function of the number
of periods spent in unemployment. Speciﬁcally, we model duration dependence
by a third order polynomial term in logt. Finally, F( ) denotes the logistic
cumulative distribution function.
2.1 Single-Spell Duration Data
For each individual, the data consist of one or more spells of unemployment. We
ﬁrst consider a single spell duration model and treat diﬀerent spells for the same
individual as independent spells of diﬀerent individuals. This is a reasonable
assumption in the absence of unobserved heterogeneity. Then, the log likelihood






mit {(1 − yit)log(1 − hi(t)) + yit loghi(t)}, (2)
where N is the number of unemployment spells in the sample, t is the largest
observed duration, yit takes the value 1 if an exit from the spell of unemployment
is observed in period t and 0 if not or if the observation is censored at t. Variable
mit equals 1 if a spell of unemployment is observed during the period t and zero
otherwise.
The model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood (ML). Notice that, since
the hazard rate hi(t) in the likelihood function is simply a logit probability,








equation restrictions)4 deﬁned on the surviving population at each duration (see
Jenkins, 1995).
However, previous estimates may be biased by the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity. Heckman (1991) argues that it is not a simple task to distinguish
duration dependence from unobserved heterogeneity. Clearly, because of the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity, the duration dependence in the observed
hazard function is more negative than otherwise since the individuals with the
highest hazards on average leave unemployment quickest. A version of the
previous model allowing for unobserved heterogeneity is given by
hi(t,ηi) = Pr(Ti = t | Ti ≥ t,bi(t),xi(t),ηi) = F(α0+α1(t)b(t)+α2(t)xi(t)+γi(t)+ηi),
(3)
where the hazard is conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity, ηi. Again,






[mit {(1 − yit)log(1 − hi(t)) + yit loghi(t)}]d (η), (4)
where  (η) is the unknown distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity.
As is usual in this type of models, the initial time does not correspond to
the date of entry into the labor market for all the individuals in the sample.
The beginning of the labor market process, from the end of schooling up to the
state occupied on the initial period, is unobserved for the econometrician and
possibly correlated with ηi. Consequently we have to consider the problem of
initial conditions.
Two approaches can be used in order to solve this problem (see Hsiao, 1986).
The ﬁrst approach is to use the joint distribution of all outcomes -including
that in the initial time period- conditional on unobserved heterogeneity. As
Wooldridge (2005) points out, the main complication with this approach is spec-
ifying the distribution of the initial condition given unobserved heterogeneity.
4Speciﬁcally, in our estimates we impose α2(t) = α2 for all regressors but the ones mea-








For the dynamic probit model with covariates, Heckman (1981) proposed ap-
proximating the conditional distribution of the initial condition. This avoids
the practical problem of not being able to ﬁnd the conditional distribution of
the initial value. But this approach is computationally cumbersome. The other
method is proposed by Wooldridge (2005) and consists in modeling the unob-
served heterogeneity conditionally on the initial condition (and the exogenous
variables in all time periods) and to specify the unconditional distribution of
unobserved factors. In this paper we consider this method, because it is ﬂexible
and simple to implement since the likelihood of interest has the same structure
as in the standard random eﬀects model, except that the explanatory variables
at each time includes the initial condition. So we can add it as an additional
explanatory variable and use our standard random eﬀects model to estimate the
parameters of interest. Speciﬁcally, we will condition on the number of months
the individuals have been employed before we observe their labor market status
in our sample.5
Previous likelihood function (4) is a typical form of the statistical mixture
model. The problem of how to control for the unobserved mixing distribution
 (η) has been addressed extensively in the literature. Standard approaches re-
quire making strong and arbitrary assumptions about distribution functions for
population heterogeneity η. A popular choice is the family of Gamma distribu-
tions. This stems from analytic tractability6 although it suﬀers from the typical
estimation bias due to an incorrect parametrization of  (η).7
Heckman and Singer (1984) propose controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
without explicitly specifying a parametric distribution for heterogeneity. They
5Notice that ηi should also be correlated with the set of individual exogenous characteristics
in all time periods. This means that the variables xi(1),...,xi(T) should also be added to the
list of explanatory variables to allow for such correlation. Nonetheless, in our application all
the exogenous variables potentially correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity are time-
constant.
6See Abbring and Van den Berg (1998) for a justiﬁcation for the choice of the family of
Gamma distributions.
7Moreover, Heckman and Singer (1984) show that the problem of overparametrization can








adopted a semi-parametric approach to identify the unobserved distribution
from a mixed distribution assuming that ηi is a random eﬀect independent
of all individual characteristics, although correlated with γi(t). For discrete
duration models, the only assumption is that the distribution of the unobserved
heterogeneity has a ﬁnite mean.
Therefore, assuming that the random variable ηi is discrete with ﬁnite sup-
port given by r mass points s1,...,sr, and the corresponding probability mass








[mit {(1 − yit)log(1 − hi(t,sℓ)) + yit loghi(t,sℓ)}]Pr(ηi = sℓ),
(5)
where
hi(t,sℓ) = F(α0 + α1(t)bi(t) + α2(t)xi(t) + γi(t) + sℓ). (6)
The idea is that if the number of points of support increases, then any true
underlying distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity can be approximated
well. Nonetheless, in practice it is often diﬃcult to ﬁnd more than a few diﬀerent
mass points.8 This fact reﬂects a lack of informativeness on the distribution of
the unobserved heterogeneity in the data, especially when only single spell data
on durations are available.9
The availability of data on multiple spells for the same individual is crucial
for identifying the parameters of interest in a duration model in the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity. In this case, the support point approach by Heckman
and Singer (1984) allows for a better identiﬁcation than when only a single spell
is available for each individual. Moreover, the availability of multiple spells
allows us to transform the model to rule out the individual unobserved eﬀects,
in the spirit of the ﬁxed eﬀects discrete choice panel data models. Next section
outlines both methods for multiple spell data.
8In our estimates we impose the number of mass points to be equal to three.
9Another drawback of this approach is that the distributional properties of the estimators








2.2 Multi-Spell Duration Data
2.2.1 Random Eﬀects Estimator
Multivariate duration data occur when several spells are observed for each indi-
vidual in the sample. In this case it is possible to look into possible dependence
across spells for the same individual. This topic has been ﬁrst discussed by
Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice (1980).10
Notice that if the hazard rate allows for unobserved heterogeneity and multiple-
spell data are available, we should estimate jointly durations in unemployment
and in employment, since the unobserved heterogeneity is, in general, corre-
lated across diﬀerent types of spells. Therefore, accounting for the two states,
unemployment (u) and employment (e), the model is deﬁned by
hk
i(t,ηk




i (t) + ηk
i ), k = u,e, (7)
where ηe
i = δηu
i . That is, we assume that for each individual the unobserved
heterogeneity component is the same in all spells of the same type, and only
diﬀers across types of spells by a constant, δ.
Since employment and unemployment spells cannot be treated separately, we
need to specify the likelihood function for all spells and integrate out the random
eﬀects (see Cheser and Lancaster, 1983, for a detailed discussion). Thus, follow-
ing the support point approach by Heckman and Singer (1984), the likelihood




























where uit = 1 if during the period t a spell of unemployment is observed and zero
otherwise, and eit = 1 if during the period t a spell of employment is observed
and zero otherwise.
10Empirical analysis of models with multiple-spell duration data are for instance Newman









If more than one observation is available for each duration, then it is possible to
identify the model without imposing untestable assumptions of the unobserved
heterogeneity distribution. The idea, loosely speaking, is that in this case, the
duration analysis becomes similar to the standard dynamic panel data analysis,
where one can get rid of the so called “ﬁxed-eﬀects” before estimating the other
parameters.
The ﬁxed eﬀects approach has been scarcely used in duration analysis. Fred-
eriksen et al. (2007) proposed a method to estimate discrete time duration
models allowing for group level heterogeneity in models for single and multiple
spells. We follow this approach to estimate a ﬁxed eﬀects model in a multiple
spell framework.11 That is, in our application the grouping results from multi-
ple spells for the same individual. We consider the parametric version of their
model12 and, as in previous sections, we assume a conditional logistic distribu-
tion.
The model is in the spirit of the ﬁxed-eﬀects panel data model, in which
the distribution of the individual eﬀect is left unrestricted and allowed to be
correlated with the explanatory variables. This is attractive since it ensures
that the conditional distribution of the individual eﬀects does not play any
role in identifying the parameters of interest. Moreover, notice that within
this approach consistent estimators of the parameters of interest are available
without assumptions on the initial conditions since it is possible to ﬁnd an
objective function that eliminates the unobserved eﬀects.
To see how the approach works, it is useful to formulate the model as a
discrete choice model. We use yk
ijt = 1 to denote that the individual i during
11Ridder and Tunali (1999) also follow a ﬁxed eﬀects approach but it only works when
durations are continuous.
















ijt ≥ 0), k = u,e (9)
In the spirit of linear panel data models, the proposed estimation technique
is based on the observations for which the number of spells per individual, Ji,
is larger than 1.13 It is possible to construct conditional statements and to get
rid oﬀ the unobserved heterogeneity by using only the spells of unemployment
or only the spells of employment. Therefore, within this framework, it is not
necessary to jointly model the spells of unemployment and employment in order
to get consistent estimates of the parameters of interest. Thus, given that our
main interest is the process for unemployment, we will drop out the unobserved
heterogeneity by using only spells of unemployment for each individual.
For simplicity and to ﬁx ideas, let’s assume that the number of spells for all




2. What we do to elim-
inate the unobserved heterogeneity is to compare ﬁrst to second spells for each
individual and each period, t. That is, we compare yu
i2t to yu
i1t assuming that
the individual speciﬁc eﬀect, ηi, does not depend on the spell number. Notice
that only variables which depend on the spell number are identiﬁed and those
constant across spells for the same individual are also dropped. Speciﬁcally,
within this framework the duration dependence is not identiﬁed, although in-
teractions between the explanatory variables and the duration dependence can
be identiﬁed.
Frederiksen et al. (2007) assume that the ε′
ijts are logistically distributed
and their framework allows for feedback from the ε′s to future values of the
explanatory variables. That is, the explanatory variables can be predetermined.
In our application the only explanatory variable which could be considered as
predetermined as opposed to strictly exogenous is the indicator of beneﬁts, b.
13One could think that this could give rise to an endogenous self-selection problem. In order
to check for that, we have estimated the model which does not account for unobserved eﬀects








Nonetheless, since we observe data for beneﬁts after the spells end (the beneﬁt
entitlement is also observed in our data) we can condition on past, current and
future values of this variable. In this case, it can be treated as exogenous and
therefore we do not need to specify the feedback from ε to future values of b in
order to get consistent estimates of the parameters of interest.
Under the previous assumption (and assuming J = 2), Frederiksen et al.
(2007) show that it is possible to construct conditional statements (see Lemma 1,











1 + (xi1(t1) − xi2(t2))αu
2)1(T1i=t1,T2i>t2)
1 + exp((bi1(t1) − bi2(t2))αu




A similar approach can be used when there are more than two spells for each
individual and when the α parameters do vary with the duration (see Frederiksen
et al., 2007, for details).
3 Estimating Unemployment Duration among
Immigrants and Natives
3.1 Unemployment and the Use of Unemployment Bene-
ﬁts
Some early studies have analyzed the evolution of unemployment for immigrants
and natives. For example, Chiswick, Cohen and Zach (1997) ﬁnd for the US
that immigrants had some initial diﬃculty ﬁnding work, but their employment
and unemployment rates quickly attained levels comparable to those of native-
born. Carlin, Edin, Harkman and Holmlund (1996) examine transitions out of
unemployment in Sweden and ﬁnd that immigrants enter into employment at
a 30% lower rate than Swedish citizens. Hansen (2000) ﬁnds for Sweden that
a substantial proportion of the observed diﬀerences in unemployment spells
between natives and immigrants can be explained by diﬀerences in accumulated








(2006) study the German case and ﬁnd that immigrants stay unemployed longer
than natives. However, once immigrants ﬁnd a new job, they do not observe
diﬀerences in the employment stability compared to natives.14
For Spain, evidence from the Labor Force Survey (EPA) shows that through-
out the period 2003-2007, the unemployment rates among immigrants are about
3 percentage points higher than for natives (see Table 1). It is worth noting
that the diﬀerence in unemployment rates decreased up to 2006 and in 2007
increased again. Table 2 provides the percentage of individuals according to
the duration of their unemployment spells. Unemployment tends to be longer
for natives than for immigrants, especially for males. Since 2005, more than
50% of all unemployed stayed in that state for less than 6 months, with women,
especially natives, being those with longer unemployment spells.
There is also an increasing concern about the impact of immigration on the
costs of welfare. The available empirical evidence suggests that an increasing
number of immigrants are beneﬁciaries of welfare programs. There is little ev-
idence in the literature on this issue, especially for Europe. Borjas and Hilton
(1996) ﬁnd that in the US the immigrant-native diﬀerence in the probability of
receiving cash beneﬁts is small, but the gap widens once other programs are in-
cluded in the analysis. Blau (1984) compares the receipt of transfers by families
headed by immigrants and those headed by native-born Americans. Her main
ﬁnding is that when age and other factors are held constant, immigrant families
are less likely to rely on welfare than native families and their receipts from
social insurance programs are found to be only slightly higher. For Canada,
Baker and Benjamin (1995) ﬁnd that immigrants have lower participation rates
in Unemployment Insurance and Social Assistance than natives. They also ﬁnd
that “assimilation” leads to greater participation in both programs. Hansen
and Lofstrom (2003) ﬁnd for Sweden that immigrants use welfare to a greater
14Many of these papers do not control for unobserved heterogeneity nor allow for a diﬀerent








extent than natives and that diﬀerences cannot be explained by observable char-
acteristics. They also ﬁnd that welfare participation decreases with time spent
in Sweden.
In this paper we only focus on the receipt of unemployment beneﬁts. Second
panel of Table 1 shows the ﬁgures coming from the EPA. We can see that the use
of unemployment beneﬁts among immigrants has increased considerably since
2003. On average, the increase for natives has been 3.4 and 4.6 percentage points
for males and females respectively, while for immigrants these ﬁgures rise by 14
and 11.7 percentage points.
3.2 The Data Set
We use administrative data from the Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales
(MCVL). This data set is based on a random draw from the Social Security
archives. It provides a sample of 4% among all the aﬃliated workers, work-
ing or not, and pensioners in the year 2005. The MCVL reports information
for about 1,1 million people on their personal characteristics and employment
and unemployment spells throughout their entire labor history. Speciﬁcally, the
exact date when each job begins and ends is known.
Periods of non-employment can be identiﬁed from the dates when the ﬁrm
does not pay Social Security contributions for the worker. We can distinguish
non-employment spells in which the worker receives Unemployment Beneﬁts
(those in which payroll taxes are paid) from those which correspond to both
periods of unemployment without beneﬁts or periods of inactivity (those in
which worker contributions to Social Security are not paid). We will use the term
unemployment to name all these spells in which the worker does not work within
a ﬁrm. Moreover, we know whether the Unemployment Beneﬁts are contributive
(corresponding to the Unemployment Insurance system, which pays beneﬁts to
workers who have previously contributed when employed) or assistance ones








who have exhausted previous ones or do not qualify for receiving them).15 Given
that we have the complete labor history of the worker, we can also get the
entitlement period for the beneﬁt spells.
The main shortcoming of this data set is the lack of some personal or family
characteristics, such as marital status or number of children, which could be
important to determine, for example, the exact amount the worker can get
from Unemployment Beneﬁts. Another important caveat is that we cannot
measure the educational level of the worker, but only the qualiﬁcation level of
the previous job held. Hence, our measure of qualiﬁcation has to be taken with
caution as it does not reﬂect the actual level of qualiﬁcation of the worker but
the one corresponding to the job she previously occupied.
Our initial sample included information about 381,894 men (347,070 natives
and 24,824 immigrants) and 283,081 women (268,134 natives and 14,947 im-
migrants). Throughout this paper we consider as immigrants those individuals
residing in Spain with a nationality not belonging to any of the European Union
(as of 1995) countries. Our ﬁnal sample includes men and women aged 19 to
62 who were unemployed at some point during the period 1995-2005. We have
restricted our sample to start in 1995 since some relevant characteristics are
missing before that date. After ﬁltering the sample and applying some homo-
geneity restrictions (see Appendix), we end up with 405,731 native unemployed
workers (215,609 males and 190,122 females) and 32,089 immigrants (21,393
males and 10,696 females).
Table 3 presents the structure of our data according to the number of spells
of unemployment per individual and the duration of each spell. More than
73% of native workers have two unemployment spells or more and almost 60%
of immigrant females and 64% of immigrant males experience unemployment
at least twice. Hence, we have on average around 4 unemployment spells per








native worker and around 3 per immigrants. Regarding unemployment duration,
more than 70% of all completed unemployment spells last less than 6 months.
Moreover, average duration for completed spells are lower for immigrant males
(3.29 months) and larger for native females (4.73 months). The comparison of
these ﬁgures from our data set and the corresponding ones from the EPA (see
Table 2) shows that in our sample, considering both completed and censored
spells,16 there is a higher proportion of short unemployment spells, which makes
sense given the quarterly structure of the Spanish Labor Force Survey.
The explanatory variables used in the estimations are described in the Ap-
pendix and summary statistics are presented in Table 4. We can see that more
than 30% of native workers receive unemployment beneﬁts when starting their
unemployment spells, with this rate being much lower for immigrants (around
17%). Table 5 shows that the majority of beneﬁts receipt is on a contributive
basis and that the most likely entitlement duration is 1-8 months, especially
for native workers. The incidence of Unemployment Assistance is much higher
among women, specially immigrants. We can also observe that for censored
unemployment spells the incidence of large entitlement periods and unemploy-
ment assistance is more important than for completed spells. It is interesting
to note that immigrant workers, especially women, show a higher percentage of
entitlement spells of intermediate duration.17
There are important diﬀerences among native and immigrant workers ac-
cording to the sector where they previously worked (see Table 4). Most workers
in both groups worked in market services but an important percentage of im-
migrant males worked in the construction sector. The largest percentage of
unemployment spells are observed in the youngest category we consider (be-
16In the Labor Force Survey it is not possible to measure the exact duration for very small
unemployment spells. Furthermore, it is only possible to measure duration of ongoing spells,
not of the completed ones.
17For a number of spells we observe in the data that the worker receives both, unemployment
beneﬁts and unemployment assistance This is the reason why the percentage in the columns








tween 19 and 30 years old), although immigrants also show a large percentage
of unemployment spells in the 31-44 age range. Previous job qualiﬁcation re-
quirements are lower for immigrants than for natives. Regarding other charac-
teristics related to the previous job held, the majority of workers leave the job for
non-voluntary reasons, they were working at ﬁrms with less than 250 employees
and created years before the worker was hired (“old ﬁrms”). Less than 10% of
males and 13% of females were previously working on a permanent basis, and
the incidence of part-time employment is small among males but much larger
for females. The variable “Same Employer” measures whether the unemployed
worker returns, after leaving unemployment, to the same ﬁrm where she was
working in his last job. It is usual in the Spanish labor market for ﬁrms to ﬁre
workers in “bad” times and hire them again afterwards to save on labor costs.
Table 4 shows that this hiring policy is more frequent among native workers
(26.6% for males and 36.6% for females) than among immigrants. Finally, the
majority of immigrant males come from Africa whereas, in the case of females,
the origin is more likely to be Latin-America (see Table 6).
3.3 Empirical Hazards
In order to get an idea of the shape of the distribution of durations, we present
the evolution over time of the sample probability of leaving unemployment. That
is, we compute the number of exits from unemployment in each month divided
by the population still in unemployment at the beginning of that month. This
probability is displayed in Figure 1. We can see that there is a negative duration
dependence in all cases. The hazard decreases rapidly up to the sixth month
of unemployment. After that moment it is more or less constant. Immigrant
males are more likely to exit from unemployment than native males up to the
ninth month. Nonetheless, from that period on, the diﬀerences between both
groups are reduced. The behavior of immigrant females is quite similar to that








Figure 2 represents the eﬀect on the empirical hazards of beneﬁt receipt in
a given month. We can see that individuals not receiving beneﬁts have a higher
hazard than those receiving beneﬁts, with this diﬀerence being in general greater
for immigrants than for natives.
4 Estimation Results
In this section we report the estimates from the diﬀerent models described in the
previous section for natives and immigrants separately. The estimation results
are reported in Tables 7 and 8. We compare the results from a logit model
which does not account for the eﬀect of unobserved heterogeneity (Logit without
UH) to those of the Heckman-Singer (HS) and ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) models, which
control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and exploit the availability
of multiple spell data.18 We ﬁrst discuss duration dependence and then take
in turn the eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts. Finally, we discuss the eﬀect of
other variables. The qualitative impact of the variables are discussed in terms
of the sign and statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcients. In order to
assess the economic signiﬁcance of the eﬀects we also report predicted hazards
for some individual types.
4.1 Duration Dependence
We capture duration dependence by a third order polynomial of log duration.
We also introduce as regressors interactions of the dummy for the receipt of
unemployment beneﬁts, age, qualiﬁcation, and the employment growth rate with
logged duration. Notice that in the ﬁxed eﬀects model the eﬀect of duration
is not identiﬁed, since it is constant across spells and, therefore, it has been
dropped. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the interactions between logged
18For the Heckman-Singer model we only report the estimates corresponding to the hazard
of leaving unemployment. The estimates on the employment process, available upon request,
show basically a larger exit from employment among female workers than among males. We
do not ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences among natives and immigrants, although the procyclical








duration and explanatory variables which do vary across spells, are identiﬁed.19
The results indicate a non-monotonic duration dependence in all cases. As
expected, the coeﬃcient for the log Dur variable is in general smaller once un-
observed heterogeneity is accounted for. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that for natives,
both males and females, the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcient of the log Dur variable
between the standard logit and the HS model is larger that among immigrants.
The pattern of the predicted hazards are shown in Figures 3 and 4 for an in-
dividual with the average characteristics of our sample. We can see that the
hazard of leaving unemployment decreases rapidly with elapsed duration, as is
usually obtained in previous literature (see for instance Bover et al., 2002).
The comparison between natives and immigrants show that for females the
duration dependence is very similar at all durations in both models. For males,
we do ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences between natives and immigrants. The pre-
dicted hazard which does not control for unobserved heterogeneity (Figure 3)
shows that immigrant males have a higher probability of leaving unemploy-
ment than natives up to one year, and afterwards the behavior of both groups
of individuals becomes similar. Nonetheless, the estimates which do control for
unobserved heterogeneity (Figure 4) show the opposite result: native males have
a higher probability of leaving unemployment than immigrants since the fourth
month. This result shows the importance of accounting for unobserved eﬀects.
Actually, what we obtain is that the predicted hazards with and without con-
trol for unobserved heterogeneity are basically the same for immigrants (both
males and females) and native females, but for native males we do ﬁnd more
diﬀerences. For example, a native male who has remained unemployed for at
least ten months has a probability of leaving unemployment during his tenth
month of unemployment of approximately 11% according to the standard logit
19The results are based on the assumption that there is no feedback from one individual’s
spell to the future explanatory variables of other spells for the same individual. We have also
estimated the model allowing for a certain level of feedback, and the results, available upon








model and of 17% according to the HS model, while for immigrant males the
predicted hazards are about 12% in both models.
Since predicted hazards in Figures 3 and 4 are computed for an individual
with the average characteristics of each sample, one could think that the dif-
ferences among groups are due to the fact that we compare very heterogeneous
individuals, since natives and immigrants have diﬀerent observed characteris-
tics. In order to check for that, we have compared a more homogeneous group of
individuals and computed the predicted hazards for individuals with the same
age and qualiﬁcation.20 Figures 5 and 6 show the results for the youngest and
less qualiﬁed workers. This is the group with the largest number of observations
(around 28% of the sample for immigrants, and 24 % and 33% for native females
and males respectively). These ﬁgures show a similar pattern than the ones ob-
tained for the average worker. So this result seems to reﬂect more structural
diﬀerences among both worker groups.
4.2 Unemployment Beneﬁts
Figures 7 and 8 show that the receipt of unemployment beneﬁts reduces the
hazard of leaving unemployment, and that the reduction in the hazard is smaller
as duration increases (as indicated by the positive coeﬃcient on the interaction
between the dummy for beneﬁt receipt and log Dur). This result holds for all
groups of individuals and models considered.
When unobserved heterogeneity is not controlled for (see Figure 7), the dif-
ference of the eﬀect of receiving unemployment beneﬁts on the hazard of leaving
unemployment becomes zero after nine months of unemployment for natives,
while for immigrants this ﬁgure rises up to twelve months of unemployment
approximately. Therefore, according to these results which do not account for
unobserved eﬀects, we could conclude that the negative eﬀect of unemployment
20In order to capture better the heterogeneity among immigrants, we have also included in
the speciﬁcation four dummy variables which take the value 1 if the worker has his ﬁrst spell









beneﬁts for immigrants lasts longer than for natives. However, the HS model
shows that for native males this diﬀerence narrows after ﬁfteen months of un-
employment, while for immigrants and native females the HS and the standard
logit model provide similar results. Again, as for the duration dependence, it
seems crucial to control for unobserved heterogeneity in order to obtain an ac-
curate estimate on the eﬀect of beneﬁts. According to the results, this eﬀect
is more important for native males, for whom receiving unemployment beneﬁts
aﬀects their reservation wages much longer, and thus, their acceptance behavior.
In order to compare the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcients in the three
models considered, Figure 9 displays the odd ratio of the eﬀect of beneﬁts on
the hazard of leaving unemployment for individuals with a beneﬁt entitlement
equal to 24 months. We ﬁnd that for native males and immigrant females, the
diﬀerences between the HS and the ﬁxed eﬀects models are very small and both
estimates reduce the negative eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts considerably with
respect to the standard logit model. On the other hand, for native females and
immigrant males, standard logit and HS estimates provide similar results, while
ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of the eﬀect of beneﬁts are smaller than the ones obtained
from the other two models. This result suggests that for native females and
immigrant males there is a great deal more of unobserved heterogeneity than
the one captured by a HS model with three mass points, while for native males
and immigrant females it seems enough to account for heterogeneity with a mass
point distribution.
Concerning the eﬀect of the beneﬁt entitlement duration, the estimates show
higher exit rates for individuals with smaller entitlement to beneﬁts. Therefore,
there is an additional disincentive eﬀect of beneﬁts, beyond the direct eﬀect of
the receipt of this type of unemployment compensation. Finally, it is worth
mentioning that the diﬀerential eﬀect of the receipt of unemployment subsidies








is that probably the immigrants have less access to other sources of income and,
thus, the level of beneﬁts aﬀects their acceptance behavior a lot.21
4.3 Other Characteristics
We obtain that for immigrants and for native females, the hazard rate decreases
with age. For native males, the hazard of older workers is lower than that of
younger and middle-age workers, and it is highest for the latter ones. There
is also evidence of negative duration dependence for older workers (captured
by the interaction between age dummies and log Dur). As to qualiﬁcation,
having a high level increases the hazard only for natives, while for immigrants
reduces it. We also ﬁnd that working part-time has a negative eﬀect for all
workers, with this eﬀect being greater for males than for females. As to the
origin of immigrants, the estimates suggest higher exit rates for Latin-American
and lower ones for Asian workers.
Finally, the sample period considered in this paper corresponds to a period of
expansion in the Spanish economy.22 Therefore, it is diﬃcult to infer conclusions
about the eﬀect of the business cycle. Nonetheless, since it is measured through
the regional employment growth rate, we can exploit the regional and the time
variation to obtain an indicator of aggregate eﬀects. Our results show a negative
relationship, although it decreases with duration in unemployment (notice the
positive coeﬃcient on the interaction between the employment growth rate and
logDur). That is, it seems that for short term unemployed the hazard rate
is smaller during expansions, while for long term unemployed the eﬀect is the
opposite. In this case, the eﬀect is stronger for immigrants than for natives.
21Unemployment Subsidies in Spain pays a much lower amount than contributive beneﬁts.
22Data up to 2008 will be available in 2009. This will allow us to analyze business cycle








5 Discussion of the Results and Concluding Re-
marks
This paper studies to what extent the unemployment duration path of immi-
grants diﬀers from that of natives, once diﬀerences in observable and unobserv-
able heterogeneity are accounted for. The main contributions of the paper are
twofold. On the one hand we use a large administrative data set which contains
information on multiple spell data. This allows us to estimate discrete duration
models which disentangle unobserved heterogeneity from duration dependence.
We estimate random eﬀects models assuming that the distribution of the ef-
fects is discrete with ﬁnite support. On the other hand, since the availability
of multiple spells allows us to transform the model to rule out the individual
unobserved eﬀects, we also estimate ﬁxed eﬀects models and highlight the im-
portance of leaving the distribution of the eﬀects unrestricted in order to obtain
an accurate estimate of the eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts. Our main results
can be summarized as follows.
(i) There is a negative unemployment duration dependence in all cases. For
females, we ﬁnd similar duration behavior for natives and immigrants. For
males, we do ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences between both groups of workers. The
predicted hazard which does not control for unobserved heterogeneity, shows
that immigrant males have a higher probability of leaving unemployment than
natives. Nonetheless, the estimates which do control for unobserved heterogene-
ity show the opposite result: native males have a higher probability of leaving
unemployment than immigrants.
(ii) Receiving unemployment beneﬁts reduces the hazard of leaving unem-
ployment, and the reduction falls as duration increases. When unobserved het-
erogeneity is not controlled for, the diﬀerence in the hazard of leaving unemploy-
ment between individuals who receive and who do not receive beneﬁts becomes








ﬁgure goes up to twelve months of unemployment approximately. Therefore, ac-
cording to these results which do not account for unobserved eﬀects, we would
conclude that the negative eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts for immigrants lasts
longer than for natives. However, the estimates which do account for unobserved
eﬀects show that for native males this diﬀerence narrows after ﬁfteen months
of unemployment, while for immigrant males and native females both types of
models provide similar results.
(iii) We do not ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences in the estimated eﬀect of beneﬁts
from the random eﬀects and the ﬁxed eﬀects models for native males and immi-
grant females. Nonetheless, for native females and immigrant males, estimates
without control for unobserved heterogeneity and random eﬀects estimates do
provide very similar results, while ﬁxed eﬀects estimates are lower than the pre-
vious ones. This result suggests that for native females and immigrant males
there is a great deal more of unobserved heterogeneity than the one captured
by a random eﬀects model with three mass points, while for native males and
immigrant females it seems enough to account for heterogeneity with a mass
point distribution. This result could reﬂect a more complex inﬂuence of the
unobserved heterogeneity over the unemployment hazard rate for the former
groups.
Given previous results, it seems that it is important to accounting for un-
observed eﬀects and that mistaken policy implications can be derived due to
improper treatment of unmeasured variables. Our estimation strategy makes
it diﬃcult to interpret which factors are behind the unobserved heterogeneity,
since we have not estimated a structural model of duration. Nonetheless, a
possible explanation for the diﬀerences among groups is that the unobserved
heterogeneity mainly aﬀects one component of the hazard rate, probably the
acceptance behavior, for those individuals for whom the mass point distribution








immigrant males might have a more complex inﬂuence of such heterogeneity over
both the arrival rate of job oﬀers and the acceptance probability (see García-
Pérez, 2006) and, hence, this is not totally captured by a discrete distribution
with three mass points.
To obtain certain evidence in favour of this interpretation, we have per-
formed estimates only for those individuals who never receive unemployment
beneﬁts. The idea is that this group of workers should have a low reservation
wage and, therefore, there could be no much unobserved heterogeneity aﬀecting
their acceptance behavior. What we have found is that the estimation of the
mass points in the HS model for immigrant males and native females are very
diﬀerent from the estimates with the whole sample, while for immigrant females
and native males the estimates of the mass points are very similar in both cases.
This result suggests that for the latter group, the unobserved heterogeneity af-
fects basically the arrival rate of oﬀers, and not much their acceptance behavior,
while for immigrant males and native females the heterogeneity probably aﬀects
both the arrival rate of oﬀers and the acceptance behavior. One could think
that for native males, the unobserved factors could be related to search eﬀorts
or other factors aﬀecting the demand for labor. In the case of immigrant males,
it seems that some additional unobserved factors which aﬀect their acceptance
behavior, are not properly accounted for in our estimates. For instance, un-
observable diﬀerences among natives and immigrants could reﬂect diﬀerences
in the institutional design aﬀecting both groups of workers. The fact that im-
migrants have to renew their work permits could aﬀect their search behavior,
which diﬀers in this respect from that of natives.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the possible problem of endogenous attrition
in our multiple spell data. Formally speaking, the problem is similar to having
an unbalanced panel in the context of panel data models. That is, if there are








is related to the rate at which a job is found, then the estimator of the rate
at which individuals become employed will generally be inconsistent. To check
if our basic results are aﬀected by this problem, we have estimated the logit
model which does not account for unobserved heterogeneity selecting the sample
of individuals with just one spell of unemployment. Our results show that, as
expected, their hazard rate are smaller, but the eﬀect of duration, unemployment
beneﬁts and the comparison between immigrants and natives do not change.









The MCVL oﬀers an enormous amount of information on the labor history
of all workers in the sample. In some cases, we observe more than one register
for each contract held by the worker. In others, the same job in the same ﬁrm
may be represented by diﬀerent registers. This makes it necessary to take some
decisions about what we call an “employment spell”. Therefore, we have applied
some criteria to unify diﬀerent registers when they refer to the same employment
spell. In order to eliminate simultaneous employment spells, that is, when the
individual is working in two ﬁrms at the same time, we keep only the information
about the longest spell. Furthermore, we have also uniﬁed each two registers
when they correspond to one contract that begins before the previous one has
ﬁnished.
In order to work with a relatively homogeneous sample of workers, we con-
sider only labor histories of workers within the so-called “Régimen General”,
that is, regular workers being paid by a ﬁrm. Thus, we exclude self-employed
and workers in agriculture. We keep only workers aged between 19 and 62
years old and study only unemployment spells whose duration is greater than
15 days given that in Spain smaller durations correspond basically to job-to-job
movements. Finally, we do not include those unemployment spells for which
information about qualiﬁcation or about the contract type of the previous job is
missing.23 The step-by-step selection of our sample and the variables deﬁnition
are illustrated in the following tables.
23The type of contract is missing in the majority of unemployment spells beginning before










Males Females Males Females
No. Individuals (initial sample) 347,070 268,134 24,824 14,947
No. Spells (initial sample) 1.209,584 968,814 82,255 39,792
No. spells dropped due to:
Working in agriculture 56,652 42,676 9,445 8,675
Age below 19 or above 62 91,299 59,254 505 520
Unemployed before 1995 65,723 31,960 351 75
Unemployment duration < 15 days 38,702 29,393 1,750 596
Not working in the General Regime 23,394 8,249 2,607 1,879
No information about occupation 3,923 1,947 2 2
No information about contract type 28,724 23,704 568 137
No Individuals (ﬁnal sample) 215,609 190,122 21,393 10,696











Unempl. Beneﬁts The worker is receiving unemployment beneﬁts in the current period
Entitlement4 The entitlement period of the ongoing spell is between 1 and 4 months
Entitlement8 The entitlement period of the ongoing spell is between 5 and 8 months
Entitlement12 The entitlement period of the ongoing spell is between 9 and 12 months
Entitlement24 The entitlement period of the ongoing spell is between 13 and 24 months
Unempl. Subsidy Unemployment beneﬁts are of the assistance type
Industry Sector of activity in the previous job
Construction Sector of activity in the previous job
Non-market services Sector of activity in the previous job
∆ Empl. rate Annual growth rate of employed population in the corresponding region and period
High Occupation Occupation held in the previous job
Intermediate Occupation Occupation held in the previous job
Age 31-44 The age in the current period belongs to the interval 31-44
Age 45-62 The age in the current period belongs to the interval 45-62
New EU countries The country of origin is one of the new East. Europ. countries that belongs to the EU
Rest of Europe The country of origin is another European country not belonging to the EU
Latin-America The country of origin is one from Latin-America
Asia The country of origin is one from Asia
Fired Non voluntary exit from the previous job
Firm≥250 workers The previous ﬁrm of the worker had more than 250 workers
New Firm The worker’s previous ﬁrm was created one year before the worker was hired or less
THA Coming from a Temporary Help Agency
Permanent contract The previous job of the worker was under a permanent contract
Part-time job The previous job of the worker was under a part-time contract
Total empl. No months of employment before the ﬁrst observation in our sample
Same Employer Same employer in the following job as in the pervious one
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Table 1: Unemployment Rates and Unemployment Beneﬁts Use
Natives Immigrants
Males Females Males Females
Unemployment Rates
2003 8.02 14.44 11.57 18.67
2004 7.78 14.10 10.95 18.44
2005 6.20 10.98 8.69 12.64
2006 5.71 10.64 8.15 13.90
2007 5.70 9.76 9.33 14.48
Unempl. Beneﬁts Use∗
2003 28.47 17.89 6.90 3.62
2004 29.63 19.11 12.45 8.91
2005 32.05 19.62 16.77 6.51
2006 32.15 22.66 22.75 12.31
2007 31.86 22.54 20.89 15.38
Source: Labour Force Survey, 3rd term.








Table 2: Ongoing Unemployment Duration
Natives Immigrants
Males Females Males Females
2003
1-6 months 44.43∗ 35.09 49.85 40.90
6-12 months 20.51 20.54 20.78 22.30
+12 months 35.07 44.39 29.37 36.81
2004
1-6 months 45.57 37.20 44.20 51.78
6-12 months 21.20 20.97 27.57 20.47
+12 months 33.23 41.84 28.23 27.75
2005
1-6 months 57.62 51.32 67.38 53.86
6-12 months 12.81 13.72 13.76 17.21
+12 months 29.57 34.97 18.85 28.92
2006
1-6 months 59.58 53.70 74.29 62.89
6-12 months 13.23 14.07 10.9 11.58
+12 months 27.20 32.23 14.81 25.51
2007
1-6 months 60.61 55.75 70.02 70.02
6-12 months 14.24 14.09 12.44 14.65
+12 months 25.15 30.16 17.54 15.34
Source: Labour Force Survey.








Table 3: Number of Unemployment Spells per Individual and Unemployment
Duration
Natives Immigrants
Males Females Males Females
Number of spells per individual
1 26.62∗ 26.37 35.86 41.19
2-4 40.46 41.57 41.51 43.02
5-9 23.77 24.00 19.29 14.33
10 or more 9.15 8.06 3.34 1.46
Unempl. Duration. All spells
1-6 months 71.50∗ 67.19 75.51 67.72
6-12 months 13.70 14.38 8.58 10.75
+12 months 14.81 18.43 15.91 21.57
Unempl. Duration. Completed spells
1-6 months 76.13∗ 72.87 83.93 77.57
6-12 months 14.58 15.59 9.53 12.32
+12 months 9.29 11.59 6.54 10.11
Source: MCVL








Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Natives Immigrants
% Males % Females % Males % Females
With Unemployment Beneﬁts 32.10 30.48 17.80 16.40
Sector: Industry 13.45 10.80 11.22 8.16
Construction 30.45 1.71 46.23 3.04
Non-market services 12.99 26.82 3.81 10.98
Market services 56.66 71.37 49.84 85.90
High Occupation 14.34 23.53 4.84 10.44
Intermediate Occupation 35.91 33.40 26.96 25.08
Low Occupation 49.75 43.08 68.20 64.48
Age 19-30 70.73 70.06 53.95 56.36
Age 31-44 29.13 29.83 45.95 43.55
Age 45-62 13.45 11.11 10.57 9.27
Non voluntary exit from previous job 83.87 87.05 67.83 69.14
Firm≥250 workers 12.98 21.67 8.08 15.44
Old Firm 74.50 80.40 67.78 77.55
Coming from a Temp. Help Agency 9.67 8.94 7.77 9.58
Permanent contract 9.75 13.10 9.05 13.83
Part-time job 13.54 32.32 11.20 34.17
Total empl. (No months) 52.14 24.25 2.37 1.17
Same Employer in the following job 26.61 36.62 18.25 19.06
Private ﬁrm 93.22 85.20 99.31 98.41








Table 5: Type of Unemployment Beneﬁts
Natives Immigrants
Males Females Males Females
No. Completed Spells of Unemployment 283,382 227,526 11,840 4,566
Contributive Unempl. beneﬁts (%) 81.75 73.68 88.23 71.51
Entitlement 1-4 months 30.83 32.09 29.20 24.86
Entitlement 5-8 months 18.92 17.01 28.68 24.84
Entitlement 9-12 months 10.67 8.96 14.44 11.80
Entitlement 13-24 months 21.23 15.46 15.80 9.92
Entitlement >24 months 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.09
Unemployment Assistance (%) 21.83 29.03 13.78 31.71
No Censored Spells of Unemployment 6,729 8,257 100 54
Contributive Unempl. beneﬁts (%) 54.75 51.29 68 55.56
Entitlement 1-4 months 12.77 12.58 1.00 9.26
Entitlement 5-8 months 12.08 12.17 12.00 12.96
Entitlement 9-12 months 8.31 7.93 3.00 7.41
Entitlement 13-24 months 33.36 30.50 29.00 27.78
Entitlement >24 months 3.48 2.11 32.00 5.56
Unemployment Assistance (%) 45.25 48.71 32.00 44.44
Table 6: Immigrants in the Estimation Sample by Country of Origin
Males (%) Females (%)
New EU countries 9.37 10.57












Table 7: ML Estimates. Males
Immigrants Natives
Logit HS FE Logit HS FE
without UH without UH
log Dur -1,635 -1,630 - -2,144 -1,918 -
(0,042) (0,043) (0,010) (0,035)
(log Dur)2 0,619 0,632 - 1,031 1,006 -
(0,042) (0,042) (0,009) (0,032)
(log Dur)3 -0,122 -0,123 - -0,194 -0,184 -
(0,010) (0,010) (0,002) (0,007)
U. Beneﬁts -1,606 -1,604 -1,487 -1,155 -1,364 -1,242
(0,033) (0,033) (0,060) (0,006) (0,024) (0,011)
U. BeneﬁtsxlogDur 0,529 0,522 0,516 0,394 0,404 0,492
(0,019) (0,020) (0,038) (0,003) (0,013) (0,007)
Entitlement4 0,571 0,574 0,028 0,637 0,288 0,178
(0,031) (0,032) (0,058) (0,006) (0,025) (0,009)
Entitlement8 0,448 0,475 -0,240 0,383 0,541 -0,150
(0,032) (0,032) (0,060) (0,006) (0,022) (0,011)
Entitlement12 0,331 0,394 -0,339 0,321 0,248 -0,216
(0,040) (0,040) (0,072) (0,008) (0,032) (0,013)
Entitlement24 0,158 0,267 -0,350 0,230 0,138 -0,296
(0,040) (0,041) (0,071) (0,007) (0,029) (0,012)
U. Assitance 0,105 0,076 -0,117 -0,151 -0,233 -0,377
(0,034) (0,035) (0,062) (0,006) (0,023) (0,010)
∆ Empl. rate -4,049 -3,879 -3,490 -1,276 -0,700 -0,475
(0,358) (0,363) (0,502) (0,089) (0,319) (0,127)
∆ Empl. ratexlogDur 1,900 1,942 1,140 0,394 0,404 0,492
(0,310) (0,314) (0,592) (0,003) (0,013) (0,007)
Age 31-44 -0,022 -0,001 0,048 0,125 0,158 0,180
(0,011) (0,012) (0,037) (0,005) (0,020) (0,012)
Age 45-64 -0,067 -0,026 0,135 -0,079 -0,034 0,167
(0,025) (0,026) (0,087) (0,007) (0,033) (0,022)
Age 45-64xlogDur -0,045 -0,044 -0,023 -0,190 -0,186 -0,026
(0,020) (0,020) (0,080) (0,004) (0,015) (0,020)
Industry 0,026 0,030 -0,043 0,043 0,062 -0,015
(0,019) (0,019) (0,035) (0,004) (0,018) (0,008)
Construction 0,198 0,195 0,040 0,199 0,185 0,085
(0,013) (0,014) (0,027) (0,003) (0,015) (0,007)
Non-market services -0,145 -0,204 -0,038 -0,004 -0,015 0,011
(0,030) (0,031) (0,054) (0,005) (0,021) (0,009)
New EU countries 0,090 0,095 - - - -
(0,020) (0,022)
Rest Europe 0,018 0,029 - - - -
(0,028) (0,030)
Latin-America 0,1961 0,197 - - - -
(0,013) (0,014)
Asia -0,055 -0,061 - - - -
(0,020) (0,022)








Table 7(Cont.): ML Estimates. Males
Immigrants Natives
Logit HS FE Logit HS FE
without UH without UH
Private ﬁrm 0,176 -0,107 -0,012 0,200 0,220 0,181
(0,069) (0,047) (0,125) (0,006) (0,027) (0,012)
Same Employer 0,748 0,792 0,814 0,798 0,964 0,839
(0,014) (0,015) (0,023) (0,003) (0,012) (0,005)
Firm≥250 workers 0,003 -0,013 -0,039 0,029 0,047 0,053
(0,023) (0,024) (0,038) (0,004) (0,017) (0,007)
New ﬁrm -0,021 -0,024 0,012 -0,004 -0,019 -0,028
(0,012) (0,012) (0,018) (0,003) (0,011) (0,004)
Fired 0,040 0,013 0,037 0,032 0,017 0,009
(0,012) (0,013) (0,019) (0,004) (0,014) (0,006)
T. Help Agency 0,409 0,414 0,332 0,262 0,249 0,208
(0,026) (0,027) (0,042) (0,005) (0,021) (0,008)
High qualiﬁcation -0,164 -0,166 -0,129 0,022 -0,002 0,082
(0,026) (0,027) (0,046) (0,006) (0,023) (0,011)
Interm. qualiﬁcation 0,124 0,112 -0,003 0,196 0,171 0,088
(0,017) (0,017) (0,028) (0,004) (0,016) (0,007)
Interm. qualif.xlogDur -0,081 -0,073 -0,005 -0,070 -0,053 -0,005
(0,014) (0,015) (0,034) (0,003) (0,011) (0,006)
Permanent contract -0,257 -0,252 -0,239 -0,230 -0,227 -0,118
(0,019) (0,020) (0,033) (0,005) (0,019) (0,008)
Part-time -0,219 -0,205 -0,089 -0,289 -0,284 -0,134
(0,018) (0,018) (0,030) (0,004) (0,015) (0,006)
Total empl. -0,001 -0,002 - 0,001 0,001 -
(0,0004) (0,0004) (0,000) (0,000)
Constant -0,655 0,146 - -0,861 0,366 -
(0,074) (0,047) (0,000) (0,055)
P1 - -2,157 - - -1,166 -
(0,163) (0,109)
P2 - -0,5176 - - 0,1754 -
(0,117) (0,057)
s2 - -0,7438 - - -0,779 -
(0,067) (0,044)
s3 - -0,310 - - -1,796 -
(0,045) (0,043)
δ - 1,833 - - 0,029 -
(0,166) (0,018)
No Obs. 202,983 3,914,780
Log Lik. -103.394 -274.046 -29.395 -1.707.565 -369.958 -526.962








Table 8: ML Estimates. Females
Immigrants Natives
Logit HS FE Logit HS FE
without UH without UH
log Dur -1,698 -1,657 - -1,632 -1,498 -
(0,063) (0,065) (0,011) (0,037)
(log Dur)2 0,651 0,666 - 0,683 0,639 -
(0,060) (0,061) (0,009) (0,032)
(log Dur)3 -0,121 -0,118 - -0,1271 -0,115 -
(0,014) (0,015) (0,002) (0,007)
U. Beneﬁts -1,698 -1,736 -1,654 -1,083 -1,183 -1,132
(0,051) (0,053) (0,094) (0,007) (0,024) (0,012)
U. BeneﬁtsxlogDur 0,545 0,543 0,680 0,375 0,410 0,449
(0,032) (0,033) (0,062) (0,004) (0,013) (0,007)
Entitlement4 0,454 0,470 -0,051 0,603 0,439 0,250
(0,047) (0,052) (0,091) (0,006) (0,025) (0,010)
Entitlement8 0,490 0,498 -0,20 0,371 0,671 -0,050
(0,048) (0,052) (0,094) (0,007) (0,022) (0,012)
Entitlement12 0,260 0,347 -0,353 0,291 0,401 -0,188
(0,066) (0,071) (0,127) (0,009) (0,033) (0,015)
Entitlement24 0,09 0,232 -0,479 0,026 0,098 -0,453
(0,073) (0,078) (0,143) (0,008) (0,030) (0,015)
U. Assitance 0,135 0,079 -0,195 -0,119 -0,156 -0,263
(0,042) (0,045) (0,082) (0,006) (0,021) (0,010)
∆ Empl. rate -4,507 -4,473 -3,542 -2,166 -2,226 -1,053
(0,577) (0,611) (0,868) (0,098) (0,337) (0,142)
∆ Empl. ratexlogDur 2,969 3,029 1,061 0,375 0,410 0,449
(0,443) (0,465) (0,881) (0,004) (0,013) (0,007)
Age 31-44 -0,019 -0,015 -0,001 -0,036 -0,051 0,137
(0,017) (0,020) (0,063) (0,005) (0,019) (0,013)
Age 45-64 -0,132 -0,136 -0,220 -0,159 -0,173 0,419
(0,041) (0,046) (0,181) (0,007) (0,029) (0,026)
Age 45-64xlogDur 0,027 0,037 0,106 -0,052 -0,014 0,047
(0,030) (0,032) (0,158) (0,005) (0,016) (0,022)
Industry -0,104 -0,104 0,013 0,024 0,004 -0,005
(0,030) (0,034) (0,063) (0,005) (0,018) (0,010)
Construction -0,047 -0,085 -0,166 -0,232 -0,292 -0,052
(0,049) (0,056) (0,107) (0,011) (0,040) (0,020)
Non-market services -0,074 -0,142 0,027 0,019 -0,024 0,069
(0,028) (0,032) (0,057) (0,004) (0,016) (0,008)
New EU countries 0,112 0,100 - - - -
(0,032) (0,040)
Rest Europe -0,009 -0,025 - - - -
(0,038) (0,046)
Latin-America 0,148 0,131 - - - -
(0,022) (0,028)









Table 8(Cont.): ML Estimates. Females
Immigrants Natives
Logit HS FE Logit HS FE
without UH without UH
Private ﬁrm 0,359 0,058 0,050 0,085 0,018 0,106
(0,067) (0,071) (0,140) (0,005) (0,020) (0,011)
Same Employer 0,923 1,025 1,070 0,958 1,004 0,915
(0,021) (0,026) (0,038) (0,003) (0,012) (0,005)
Firm≥250 workers 0,092 0,069 -0,051 0,115 0,091 0,090
(0,025) (0,027) (0,044) (0,003) (0,013) (0,006)
New ﬁrm -0,069 -0,073 -0,002 -0,040 -0,040 -0,049
(0,020) (0,021) (0,033) (0,003) (0,012) (0,005)
Fired 0,111 0,069 0,081 0,108 0,007 0,046
(0,019) (0,021) (0,032) (0,004) (0,016) (0,007)
T. Help Agency 0,266 0,274 0,285 0,297 0,313 0,226
(0,032) (0,035) (0,054) (0,005) (0,020) (0,009)
High qualiﬁcation -0,047 -0,077 -0,024 0,176 0,128 0,118
(0,028) (0,031) (0,054) (0,005) (0,021) (0,011)
Interm. qualiﬁcation 0,048 0,040 0,003 0,141 0,124 0,107
(0,027) (0,029) (0,045) (0,005) (0,018) (0,008)
Interm. qualif.xlogDur -0,046 -0,046 -0,052 -0,037 -0,031 -0,031
(0,021) (0,022) (0,047) (0,003) (0,011) (0,007)
Permanent contract -0,194 -0,188 -0,176 -0,141 -0,1546 -0,102
(0,024) (0,027) (0,044) (0,004) (0,016) (0,008)
Part-time -0,163 -0,153 -0,023 -0,159 -0,123 -0,047
(0,017) (0,019) (0,031) (0,003) (0,011) (0,005)
Total empl. -0,004 -0,004 - 0,0007 0,0002 -
(0,001) (0,001) (0,000) (0,000)
Constant -1,165 0,515 - -1,069 0,433 -
(0,078) (0,132) (0,009) (0,046)
P1 - -3,228 - - -2,750 -
(0,248) (0,112)
P2 - -0,413 - - -0,517 -
(0,198) (0,042)
s2 - -1,459 - - -0,635 -
(0,098) (0,042)
s3 - -0,645 - - -1,388 -
(0,080) (0,047)
δ - 0,797 - - 0,617 -
(0,081) (0,032)
No Obs. 107,318 3,841,816
Log Lik. -47.176 -109.959 -10.911 -1.547.628 -305.880 -449.760
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Figure 4: Predicted Hazards. HS model.
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Figure 8: Predicted Hazards by UB. HS model
Immigrant, Females: effect of Unempl. Benefits (Odd ratio)














Immigrant, Males: effect of Unempl. Benefits (Odd ratio)














Native, Males: effect of Unempl. Benefits (Odd ratio)














Native, Females: effect of Unempl. Benefits (Odd ratio)














Figure 9: Eﬀect of U. Beneﬁts (odd ratio). Entitlement 24 months.
45